

# **Indian Institute of Management**

# Ahmedabad

# TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF DPCO 2013

# ON AVAILABILITY AND ACCESSIBILITY OF MEDICINES

# IN THE INDIAN PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET

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Ву

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#### **1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This report analyzes the impact of DPCO 2013 and NLEM 2015 on the affordability and accessability of the listed medicines in India.

We employ two approaches to investigate whether DPCO 2013 and NLEM 2015 increased the level of access and affordability of the selected medicines in the Indian market. We use monthly molecule level and SKU level IQVIA data and bi-monthly Rx data from SMSRC for the investigation. We also provide a macro analysis of the context of the results.

What are the macro-contextual factor and firm related factors that underlie the results of this study when a price decrease may be expected to an increase in the volumes of the drugs as per classical economics? These factors can be summarized as under.

- 1. Competition in the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry
- 2. Impact of Imported API Prices on Indian Pharma Prices
- 3. Cost Based Pricing vs. Market Based Pricing in Price Control
- 4. Firm Related Factors
- 5. Experience of Other Industries

Given the high levels of competition in pharmaceutical industry in India (the HH Index - a measure of competition is less than 0.15 for 7 of the 9 NLEM categories indicating very high competition), there is an automatic downward pressure on price and downward pressure on profits. To be noted that prices in India are already amongst the lowest in the world – recent study suggests the 2<sup>nd</sup> lowest. The research literature also suggests that market related prices (based on reference prices) are likely to be better than cost related prices; cost related price controls tend to provide higher incentives for leakages in the system. When one put this together with the increase in the API prices by as much as 30% in the duration of the data that has been analyzed for this study, it seems logical to think that firms would be under higher pressure to maintain margins (which are among the lowest in the world for profitable innovating pharmaceutical firms). An earlier study in 2016 provides preliminary evidence that firms tend to pay a lower level of attention to molecules that are under price control and where input costs are rising (it is the logical thing to do) which would provide an impetus for lower volumes. The experience of other industries (fertilizer, sugar, etc. detailed in Section 6 of this report) also suggests that price controls over a period of time lead to an increase in subsidies and sub-scale manufacturing units and a lack of new investment.

The approach used is that of event study analysis and interrupted time series / regression discontinuity. In event study, we estimate a trend line of sales for the molecules and SKUs before the policy announcement and the trend line after the announcement and see if these are significantly different from one another. In regression discontinuity, we estimate a regression with a break in the data and look at the coefficients before and after the policy change to see if there is a significant change in the sales levels after the policy change as compared to before.

Our findings can be summarized as follows.

- ► The trend growth in volume of NLEM molecules
  - Is NOT significantly different from before DPCO 2013 as compared to after DPCO
  - Is NOT significantly different from that of non-NLEM molecules in comparable periods before and after DPCO 2013
- A similar result applies after the change in NLEM in 2015.

At a more detailed level:

- 1. There was a significant **increase** in sales volume of 24%-29% of NLEM SKUs and 30%-34% of NLEM molecules.
- 2. But there was also a significant *decrease* in sales volume of 18%-30% of NLEM SKUs and 21-22% of NLEM molecules. And **no significant change** in the rest (40%-55%).
- 3. At aggregate level there was no significant increase in sales volume of NLEM SKU and molecules post DPCO 2013.

Overall, therefore, DPCO 2013 would appear not have achieved its objective of expanding affordability and accessability at the aggregate level, though there is success in selected categories.

At the prescription level, a significant increase in prescriptions was observed in only 10% - 12% of NLEM samples. Further, at the aggregate level, there was no significant positive difference in percentage sales growth of scheduled formulation and percentage sales growth of non-scheduled formulation post DPCO or % sales growth of scheduled formulation post and prior to DPCO. The same aggregate results were observed in important therapeutic areas as well.

Other findings are:

- 1. the prices of the Scheduled Formulations at the aggregate level did influence the prices of Non-Scheduled Formulations
- 2. sales of specified dosages and strengths of scheduled formulations have not grown (by volume) at a higher rate than others or at a higher rate than before DPCO.

#### 2. DPCO 2013 and NLEM 2015

The Indian Government introduced Drug Cost control order (DCCO) in 1995 in the context of liberalization of the economy to increase the penetration of health care among population by increasing the accessibility and affordability of drugs. The DCCO 1995 calculated the ceiling prices of scheduled formulation on cost-based approach. The National List of Essential Medicines of India list was released in 1996 and subsequently updated in 2003 and 2011. In 2013, Indian government introduced Drug Price control order (DPCO) with market-based pricing mechanism to calculate the ceiling prices. This is in line with National pharmaceuticals pricing policy 2012 whose goal is to enable the Indian pharmaceutical industry growth along with balancing with the objective of making availability of essential medicines at affordable prices to all. The ceiling prices and MRP of the scheduled formulations i.e. 348 medicines in 27 Therapeutic areas as per NLEM 2011 list was subsequently calculated and announced based on DPCO 2013. Further DPCO 2013 also restricted the price increase in MRP of non-scheduled formulation to a maximum of 10% during preceding 12 months. The NLEM list was subsequently updated on 2015 with addition of 106 medicines and deletion of 80 medicines from NLEM 2011 resulting in total of 376 medicines in 30 therapeutic categories.

The performance of the Indian Pharmaceutical Market as a whole since the introduction of DPCO 2013 is given in figure 2.1 and the value and unit share of NLEM and non-NLEM medicines for important therapeutic areas based on IQVIA TA for MAT July 2018 is given in figure 2.2.

	Value Growth (MAT July)							
	2014	2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019						
IPM	8%	15%	11%	8%	7%	9%		
NLEM	-9%	10%	5%	-6%	3%	6%		
Non NLEM	11%	16%	12%	10%	7%	10%		

Figure 2.1 Value Growth of Indian Pharmaceutical Market (IPM), MAT July Ref (PwC API Paper)

IQVIA Supergroup /			Non N	NLEM					Non N	LEM		
TA	NLEM (	Category	Cate	gory	То	tal	NLEM Ca	tegory	Categ	ory	Tot	al
	IND or	Shara	IND or	Shara	IND or	Shara	Units	Shara	Units	Shara	Units	Shara
Anti Diabotic		0.57%	11094	9 71%	11000	0.20%	2225.20		1169251		1401770	5 71%
Anti malariala	274	0.37%	11064	0.71%	110UZ	9.20%	255520	0.95%	07202	4.70%	122024	5.71%
	Z74	0.22%	237	0.19%	15067	0.40%	1100201	0.15%	0/205	0.50%	125954	0.50%
Anti-Infectives	5486	4.31%	10381	8.16%	15867	12.47%	1169361	4.76%	1547793	6.31%	2/1/154	11.07%
Anti-Parasitic	189	0.15%	180	0.14%	369	0.29%	206327	0.84%	84524	0.34%	290851	1.19%
Anti-IB	97	0.08%	287	0.23%	384	0.30%	25831	0.11%	123229	0.50%	149060	0.61%
Antivirals	440	0.35%	610	0.48%	1050	0.82%	11757	0.05%	12244	0.05%	24001	0.10%
Blood Related	293	0.23%	891	0.70%	1184	0.93%	33855	0.14%	73074	0.30%	106928	0.44%
Cardiac Related	3344	2.63%	11605	9.12%	14950	11.75%	889607	3.62%	1705745	6.95%	2595352	10.57%
Dermatology	444	0.35%	9341	7.34%	9785	7.69%	194809	0.79%	1470152	5.99%	1664962	6.78%
Gastro Intestinal	1439	1.13%	11943	9.39%	13382	10.52%	903843	3.68%	2891965	11.78%	3795808	15.47%
Gynaecology	488	0.38%	5716	4.49%	6204	4.88%	122001	0.50%	474799	1.93%	596800	2.43%
Hormones	1132	0.89%	909	0.71%	2041	1.60%	660205	2.69%	290166	1.18%	950371	3.87%
Neuro / CNS	1850	1.45%	5504	4.33%	7354	5.78%	497888	2.03%	845612	3.45%	1343500	5.47%
Oncology	806	0.63%	1141	0.90%	1947	1.53%	28917	0.12%	10720	0.04%	39638	0.16%
Ophthal / Otologicals	96	0.08%	2373	1.86%	2469	1.94%	60629	0.25%	367466	1.50%	428095	1.74%
Others	67	0.05%	1180	0.93%	1248	0.98%	3336	0.01%	147220	0.60%	150556	0.61%
Pain / Analgesics	1286	1.01%	8581	6.74%	9867	7.75%	753572	3.07%	1900377	7.74%	2653949	10.81%
Parenteral	57	0.04%	139	0.11%	196	0.15%	30171	0.12%	21919	0.09%	52090	0.21%
Respiratory	1141	0.90%	8915	7.01%	10057	7.90%	442716	1.80%	2332728	9.50%	2775444	11.31%
Urology	2	0.00%	2192	1.72%	2193	1.72%	4	0.00%	198137	0.81%	198141	0.81%
Vaccines	440	0.35%	2028	1.59%	2468	1.94%	96400	0.39%	22890	0.09%	119290	0.49%
Vitamins / Minerals	203	0.16%	9784	7.69%	9987	7.85%	74219	0.30%	2054233	8.37%	2128452	8.67%
Other Items			1938	1.52%	1938	1.52%			237379	0.97%	237379	0.97%
Total	20292	15.96%	106961	84.05%	127253	100.0%	6475707	26.38%	18067826	73.62%	24543533	100.00%

Figure 2.2 Value and Unit share of NLEM & non NLEM medicines of IPM, MAT July 2018 Ref (IQVIA)

#### **3. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY**

The purpose of this study is to ascertain if the DPCO 2013 achieved its objectives. The primary objective of NLEM introduced by Indian government is to promote rational use of medicines considering the three important aspects i.e. cost, safety and efficacy. Similarly, the objective of DPCO 2013, which replaced DPCO 1995, is to ensure the growth of pharmaceutical industry while balancing the objective of Drug price control.

The objective of the proposed study is to measure the impact of DPCO 2013

- on availability of and access to scheduled formulations;
- on availability of and access to similar non-scheduled formulations; and
- on promoting standard treatment guidelines and rational use of medicine.

The research questions which this study attempts to answer are

1) What has been the impact of price controls (specifically DPCO 2013) on the sales of and availability of formulations that came under price control?

2) Have the sales and availability increased / decreased or remained about the same at the SKU level?

- a. By sale volume of Scheduled Formulations, and
- b. By Therapeutic Category (TC)

3) Have the sales of specified dosages and strengths have grown (by volume) at a higher rate than before (Prior to DPCO 2013), thereby promoting rational use of medicines?

4) What has been the impact of price controls on the price and sales of Non-Scheduled Formulations?

To answer these research questions, we formulated the following hypothesis with the apriori aggregate level hypotheses being that the Price control has achieved its objectives.

1. H1: Access and availability of Scheduled Formulations have improved (by volume) under the DPCO 2013.

2. H2: Post DPCO 2013, the prices of Scheduled Formulations had an influence on the prices of Non-Scheduled Formulations;

3. H3: Post DPCO, 2013, sales of specified dosages and strengths have grown (by volume) at a higher rate than *others*, thereby promoting standard treatment guidelines;

4. H4: Post DPCO, 2013, sales of specified dosages and strengths have grown (by volume) at a higher rate than *before* (Prior to DPCO 2013), thereby promoting rational use of medicines;

#### 4. STUDY METHODOLOGY AND DATA

We used Event Study Method and Interrupted Study Analysis methods to test the above hypothesis on the monthly unit sales data from IQVIA and bimonthly RX data from SMSRC.

#### 4.1 Event Study Method

Event study method is the first method we used to examine the impact of DPCO 2013 on sales units of both NLEM and non NLEM sample medicines. Event studies are commonly used in finance area to estimate the impact of an event on stock returns of target companies. In this study, we adapt the event study methodology to estimate the impact of event i.e. DPCO 2013 on the sales return of each molecule and SKU. The event study used in this paper consists of three stages: estimating a SARIMA forecast function (with or without drift) for each molecule and SKU based on their corresponding historic sales volume data, creating a baseline sales forecast based on forecast function developed in stage 1 for the period immediately following DPCO 2013 (termed the event window) and comparing the actual sales volume with the baseline to isolate the impact of the event during event window. The difference between hypothetical forecasted sales that would have happened in the absence of the event and actual sales is termed as abnormal return. We then test the significance of the abnormal return i.e. whether it is significant from 0 and collate the data for all the samples to determine the impact of DCPO on medicine sales.

The estimation period is from August 2010 to April 2013, a total of 33 months. We used the IQVIA monthly unit sales data for the above period to fit a forecast function for each individual NLEM and non NLEM molecule/SKU. The announcement of DPCO in May 2013 is the event whose impact this study is estimating. The event is followed by event window where the impact

of the event is felt the most. In this study we proposed July 2013 to June 2014 as event window. The firms were given a period of 45 days to implement the price change as per regulation and the enforcement of NLEM 2013 was expected to be complete by end of June 2013. Hence the event window is taken as the one-year period from July 2013.

We use the forecast function part of the in R and the estimated forecast models in stage 1 to estimate point forecasts for each month between July 2013 to June 2014. These point forecasts indicate the sales volume that would have been attained in the case of non-event (i.e., DPCO not being enacted). Hence the difference between the actual sales volume and the forecasted volume may be attributed to the event, DPCO 2013. We compute the difference for each of the sample NLEM & non NLEM molecule/SKU for the 12-month period. The differences over the 12-month period is then added for each molecule to arrive at "cumulative abnormal change" (CAC) for that molecule/SKU. This value denotes the impact of DPCO on that molecule/SKU sales volume in the 1-year period. The estimated model and cumulative abnormal change for the 109 sample molecules and 186 sample SKU for the event "DPCO 2103" is presented in Appendix A. The results of all individual NLEM/non NLEM samples were collated and a ttest was conducted to test whether there is significant difference in impact of DCPO 2013 on the NLEM and non-NLEM samples. The same exercise was repeated for the next event i.e. announcement of NLEM 2015 scheduled formulation list (Forecast model development period Jan 2014 – Dec 2105 & Event Window Mar 2016 – Feb 2107). We repeated the analysis for both the two events for RX data to study the impact of DCPO 2013 and NLEM 2015 on the prescriptions issued by doctors. The results will be discussed in detail in Results section.

#### 4.1 Interrupted Time Series / Regression Discontinuity (ITS)

Event study is traditionally used to study the short-term impact of an event. In this study we measure the impact of the event i.e. 2013 over a short time horizon of 12 months. The limitation is mainly due to using forecasted sales based on prior sales figure. The forecast become more error as we move away from the estimation period and hence, they are typically limited to a shorter time period where there are no significant forecast errors. However, this limitation is overcome by Interrupted Time Series / Regression Discontinuity approach which uses the actual sales both before and after the event to study the impact of an event. Further another advantage of ITS is it can measure both the short-term impact (discontinuity at the time of an event characterized by sudden increase /decrease in sales) and long-term impact (significant difference in the long-term sales trend before and after event) of the event.

Interrupted time series is the strongest, quasi- experimental design to evaluate longitudinal effects of time- delimited interventions (Wagner et al. 2006). Wagner et al showed that by using

segmented regression analysis of interrupted time series data we can estimate dynamic changes in various processes and outcomes following interventions intended to change medication use, while controlling for secular changes that may have occurred in the absence of the intervention. ITS is similarly used to study the effect of several interventions both in medical context (Hye-Young Kwon et al., 2013, Fretheim et al. 2007, & Penfold et al 2013) as well as in the policy analysis context (Biglan et al.2000, & Pridemore et al. (2014)).

Interrupted time series is a segmented regression done by adding dummy variable for presence/absence of policy intervention and separate variable for time period after policy

implementation. In illustrative data example given in Fig 4.1 the rate is the dependent variable and the three dependent variables are T (Time from first data point), X (Dummy variable for intervention) and XT (time after interruption). The regression coefficients of T, X and XT will give pre intervention trend, post intervention level change (regression discontinuity) and post intervention level change.

Year	Rate	Τ	X	ХТ
2001	31.67	1	0	0
2002	30.19	2	0	0
2003	32.44	3	0	0
2004	31.50	4	0	0
2005	29.62	5	0	0
2006	30.18	6	0	0
2007	29.76	7	0	0
2008	29.89	8	0	0
2009	25.42	9	1	1
2010	24.26	10	1	2
2011	25.11	11	1	3
2012	24.07	12	1	4
2013	23.95	13	1	5
2014	22.78	14	1	6
2015	21.12	15	1	7

Fig 4.1 Example data for illustration of ITS (Ref www.sas.com)

In our study the sales units or RX, as case may be, is the dependent variable. If the DPCO 2103 has positively impacted the sales of molecules/SKU we expect the coefficients of post intervention level and/or trend to be positively significant.

The ITS was conducted on the data for the period between Aug 2010 -Nov 2105 i.e. 29 months after the introduction of DPCO 2013. As it can be noted ITS helps us understand the impact of DPCO 2103 over a long-time horizon (29 months) viz a viz short-time horizon of Event study analysis (12 months). We estimated both the level change (regression discontinuity – short term impact) and post intervention trend change (long term impact) which gives us the total impact of DPCO 2103 on sales units / RX of sample NLEM/non NLEM molecules/SKU. The ITS analysis is once again conducted at each molecule/SKU level and once again the results are

collated for the study of overall impact of DPCO 2103. The results of ITS analysis is given for in Appendix B.

**Data:** The sample data selected for this study was at two levels of aggregation. The first is at molecule level which is the aggregated sales of all SKUs under the selected molecule and the second aggregation is at SKU level. We selected randomly 47 NLEM molecules and 62 non NLEM molecules such that they are evenly distributed among the important therapeutic categories. We chose 127 NLEM SKUs under the chosen NLEM molecules and 59 non NLEM SKUs for analysis of impact of DCPO 2013 at SKU level. However, 18 molecules and 37 SKUs which were not under NLEM 2011 were subsequently added to NLEM 2015 list. Thus, the above molecules/SKU were part of non NLEM sample for DPCO 2013 analysis and part of NLEM ample for NLEM 2015 analysis. SMSRC provided bimonthly RX data for all the above selected sample of molecules/SKU which is used to study the impact of DCPO 2103 and NLEM 2015 on prescriptions issued by doctors.

The sample selected was not sufficient to infer decisions at therapeutic areas described by IQVIA. To further understand the impact of DPCO 2013 at therapeutic level we aggregated the sample in eight broad therapeutic areas mapping both DPCO categories and IQVIA therapeutic areas. The Annexure C list the eight therapeutic categories along with mapped DPCO and IQVIA categories.

The Fig 4.2 shows the category wise split of the samples selected along with their corresponding sales in terms of volume and revenue based on MAT July 2018 (IQVIA Database).

	IPA Study								
S.No	Categories		MAT J	uly 2018		NLEM Sar	nples	Non NLEM Samples	
			INR	Units	Units				
		INR cr	Share	'000	Share	Molecules	SKU	Molecules	SKU
1	Anti Infactivos	27066	22.0%	4060061	20.2%	10	10	16	10
1	Anti-infectives	27900	22.0%	4909901	20.2%	19	40	10	12
2	Gastro Intestinal	21780	17.1%	4590749	18.7%	8	17	8	5
3	Others	18306	14.4%	3115863	12.7%	1	5	11	8
4	Neuro / Analgesics	17221	13.5%	3997449	16.3%	4	13	7	10
•		1/221	10.070	0007110	10.070		10		10
5	Blood Related	16134	12.7%	2702280	11.0%	7	21	6	7
6	Hormones	13843	10.9%	2352149	9.6%	6	16	5	4
7	Respiratory	10057	7.9%	2775444	11.3%	2	7	5	10
8	Oncology	1947	1.5%	39638	0.2%	0	0	4	3
	Total	127253	100%	24543533	100%	47	127	62	59

Fig 4.3 – Category wise Sample Selection

#### 5. HYPOTHESIS TESTING AND RESULTS

H1: Access and availability of Scheduled Formulations have improved (by volume) under the DPCO 2013.

The Hypothesis 1 is tested using both the sales volume data and RX data. If the objective of DPCO 2103 is met then the access and availability of Scheduled formulations should have increased significantly than the average increase prior to the introduction of the DPCO 2013. We measure the increase in availability and accessibility through the proxy variables of increase in both the sales volume of the Scheduled formulations and prescriptions generated post DPCO 2013. As described above we conducted the Event study and Interrupted Time Series analysis on each and every Molecule/SKU samples. The results are given in the following tables.

DPCO 2013 IMPACT (EVENT STUDY) - SALES VOLUME							
	NEGATIVE	POSITIVE	NON-		NEGATIVE	POSITIVE	NON-
	IMPACT	IMPACT	SIGNIFICANT	TOTAL	IMPACT	IMPACT	SIGNIFICANT
	(Nos)	(Nos)	(Nos)	(Nos)	%	%	%
	SKU LEVEL ANALYSIS						
NLEM SKU	38	30	59	127	29.92%	23.62%	46.46%
NON NLEM SKU	22	17	20	59	37.29%	28.81%	33.90%
			MOLECU	LE LEVEL	ANALYSIS		
NLEM MOLECULE	10	14	23	47	21.28%	29.79%	48.94%
NON NLEM MOLECULE	14	23	25	62	22.58%	37.10%	40.32%
TABLE 5.1							

The results as shown in Table 5.1 shows that DPCO 2013 has significantly increase the sales volume of 23.62 % of sample NLEM SKU and 29.79 % of sample NLEM molecules. Based on t-test we reject the hypothesis that DPCO 2013 has increased the sales volume of the Scheduled formulations. On the same sample, as discussed in methodology section, we conducted the Interrupted Time Series (ITS) analysis and the results are given in TABLE 5.2.

	DPCO 2013 (ITS) - SALES VOLUME						
	NEGATIVE	POSITIVE	NON-		NEGATIVE	POSITIVE	NON-
	IMPACT	IMPACT	SIGNIFICANT	TOTAL	IMPACT	IMPACT	SIGNIFICANT
	(Nos)	(Nos)	(Nos)	(Nos)	%	%	%
		SKU LEVEL ANALYSIS					
NLEM SKU	22	37	68	127	17.32%	29.13%	53.54%
NON NLEM SKU	8	22	29	59	13.56%	37.29%	49.15%
			MOLECU	LE LEVEL	ANALYSIS		
NLEM MOLECULE	10	16	21	47	21.28%	34.04%	44.68%
NON NLEM							
MOLECULE	8	17	36	61	13.11%	27.87%	59.02%
TABLE 5.2							

The results in Table 5.2 validates the result obtained in earlier analysis. Once again, we reject the hypothesis 1 i.e. there is no significant increase in sales in scheduled formulations.

Having tested the sales volume of scheduled formulations we proceed to analyze the impact of DPCO 2013 on the other component of accessibility and availability of medicine i.e. prescriptions issued by doctors. Using the bimonthly SMSRC RX data we conducted ITS analysis to check whether the DPCO 2013 has increased the number of prescriptions of scheduled formulations. The results are given in Table 5.3.

DPCO 2013 (ITS) – RX							
	NEGATIVE	POSITIVE	NON-		NEGATIVE	POSITIVE	NON-
	IMPACT	IMPACT	SIGNIFICANT	TOTAL	IMPACT	IMPACT	SIGNIFICANT
	(Nos)	(Nos)	(Nos)	(Nos)	%	%	%
		SKU LEVEL ANALYSIS					
NLEM SKU	10	11	92	113	8.85%	9.73%	81.42%
NON NLEM SKU	7	4	45	56	12.50%	7.14%	80.36%
			MOLECU	LE LEVEL	ANALYSIS		
NLEM MOLECULE	4	5	34	43	9.30%	11.63%	79.07%
NON NLEM							
MOLECULE	6	4	47	57	10.53%	7.02%	82.46%
TABLE 5.3							

The % of NLEM sample which had a significant increase in prescriptions post DPCO 2013 is in the range of 7% -12 %. The proportion of sample with positive impact is less than those observed for the positive increase in sales units. Similarly, the negative impact post DPCO 2103 is also limited in the range of 9% - 12% which is less than proportion of samples which felt negative impact post DPCO 2013. More than 80% of samples doesn't have any significant impact in prescription numbers post DPCO 2103. Once again, the Hypothesis 1 get rejected. That is, DPCO and NLEM have not not significantly increased sales volumes in the categories tested.

A further detailed analysis was done on the individual samples which had a positive and negative impact due to DPCO 2013. The Table 5.4 give the list of molecules which at aggregate level has significant increase in sales post DPCO 2013.

S.No	NLEM Molecule	ΙQVIA ΤΑ	IPA Study Cat
1	Ampicillin	Anti-infectives	Anti-Infectives
2	Albendazole	Anti-Parasitic	Anti-Infectives
3	Acyclovir	Antivirals	Anti-Infectives
4	Acyclovir	Antivirals	Anti-Infectives
5	Clotrimazole	Derma	Anti-Infectives
6	Fluconazole	Derma	Anti-Infectives
7	Salicylic acid	Derma	Anti-Infectives
	Povidone		
8	iodine	Derma	Anti-Infectives
			Cardiac and Blood
9	Atorvastatin	Cardiac	Related
10	Ondansetron	Gastro Intestinal	Gastro Intestinal
11	Nitrofurantoin	Gynaec.	Gastro Intestinal
12	Prednisolone	Hormones	Hormones
13	Levothyroxine	Hormones	Hormones
		Pain /	
14	Paracetamol	Analgesics	Neuro / Analgesics
15	Cetirizine	Respiratory	Respiratory

NLEM MOLECULE SAMPLE - POSITIVE IMPACT SALES POST DPCO

Similarly, the Table 5.5 give the list of non NLEM molecules which has positive impact post DPCO 2103.

S.No	NLEM Molecule	ΙQVIA ΤΑ	IPA Study Cat
1	MEROPENEM TRIHYDRATE	Anti-infectives	Anti-Infectives
2	ALBENDAZOLE + IVERMECTIN	Anti-Parasitic	Anti-Infectives
3	ORNIDAZOLE	Anti-Parasitic	Anti-Infectives
4	ITRACONAZOLE	Derma	Anti-Infectives
5	LULICONAZOLE	Derma	Anti-Infectives
C	DARBEPOETIN ALFA	Diago Delated	Cardiac and Blood
6	KECUIVIBINAN I	BIOOD KEIDTED	Kelated
7	Lactulose	Gastro Intestinal	Gastro Intestinal
	DOMPERIDONE +		
8	PANTOPRAZOLE SODIUM SALT	Gastro Intestinal	Gastro Intestinal
9	SILDENAFIL CITRATE	Urology	Gastro Intestinal
	GLIMEPIRIDE + METFORMIN		
10	HYDROCHLORIDE	Anti-Diabetic	Hormones
11	Bicalutamide	Oncology	Oncology
	MYCOPHENOLIC ACID SODIUM		
12	SALT	Oncology	Oncology
13	Letrozole	Oncology	Oncology
	BRIMONIDINE TARTRATE +	Ophthal /	
14	TIMOLOL MALEATE	Otologicals	Others
	T A I		

NON NLEM MOLECULE SAMPLE - POSITIVE IMPACT SALES POST DPCO 2103

TABLE 5.5

The Table 5.6 and 5.7 give the list of samples of NLEM and non NLEM molecules which has shown significant negative impact post DPCO 2013.

	NLEW MOLECOLE SAMPLE - NEGATIVE IMPACT SALES POST DPCO 2105					
S.No	NLEM Molecule	IQVIA TA	IPA Study Cat			
1	Ceftriaxone	Anti-infectives	Anti-Infectives			
2	Metronidazole	Anti-infectives	Anti-Infectives			
3	Cefixime	Cefixime Anti-infectives Anti-Infectives				
4	Metoprolol	Cardiac	Cardiac and Blood Related			
5	Propranolol	Cardiac	Cardiac and Blood Related			
6	Ranitidine	Gastro Intestinal	Gastro Intestinal			
7	Dexamethasone	Hormones	Hormones			

NLEM MOLECULE SAMPLE - NEGATIVE IMPACT SALES POST DPCO 2103

8	Trihexyphenidyl	Neuro / CNS	Neuro / Analgesics		
TABLE 5.5					

#### NON NLEM MOLECULE SAMPLE - NEGATIVE IMPACT SALES POST DPCO 2103

S.No	NLEM Molecule	ΙQVIA ΤΑ	IPA Study Cat		
1	ALBENDAZOLE + IVERMECTIN	Anti-infectives	Anti-Infectives		
2	LULICONAZOLE	Anti-infectives	Anti-Infectives		
	DARBEPOETIN ALFA				
3	RECOMBINANT	Antivirals	Anti-Infectives		
4	ORNIDAZOLE	Gastro Intestinal	Gastro Intestinal		
5	MEROPENEM TRIHYDRATE	Anti-Diabetic	Hormones		
6	ITRACONAZOLE	Neuro / CNS	Neuro / Analgesics		
TABLE 5.6					

# The sample molecules which significantly show increase or decrease in sales post DPCO is shown on therapeutic area wise in Table 5.7.

	IPA Study	NL	EM Molecı	ules	Non NLEM Molecules		
	Therapeutic		Positive	Negative		Positive	Negative
S.No	Categories	Sample	Impact	Impact	Sample	Impact	Impact
		(Nos)	%	%	(Nos)	%	%
1	Anti-Infectives	19	42%	16%	16	31%	19%
2	Gastro Intestinal	8	25%	13%	8	38%	13%
3	Others	1	0%	0%	11	27%	0%
	Neuro /						
4	Analgesics	4	25%	25%	7	0%	14%
	Cardiac and Blood						
5	Related	7	14%	29%	6	17%	0%
6	Hormones	6	33%	17%	5	20%	20%
7	Respiratory	2	50%	0%	5	0%	0%
8	Oncology	0	0%	0%	4	75%	0%
	Total	47	32%	17%	62	26%	10%
			TABLE	5.7			

From the above table it can be inferred that samples from Oncology and Anti-Infectives has higher proportion of sample molecules with positive impact post DPCO. Still more than half of the sample in NLEM molecules doesn't significantly increase in sales post DPCO. Thus, a closer look at the sample molecules at Therapeutic Area level is similar to the general pattern observed till now. Based on all the above analysis we reject the null hypothesis 1 i.e. Access and availability of Scheduled Formulations have not increased significantly (by volume) under the DPCO 2013.

**Hypothesis 2:** Post DPCO 2013, the prices of Scheduled Formulations had an influence on the prices of Non-Scheduled Formulations

The DPCO 2013 is expected to negatively impact the trend of prices of scheduled formulation. Since DPCO 2013 is market-based pricing mechanism any negative impact in scheduled formulation is expected to impact negatively the prices of non-scheduled formulation. DPCO 2013 also introduced a cap of 10% on increase in MRP over preceding 12 months for nonscheduled formulation. We hypothesize that the cap on MRP increase and negative impact on price trend of scheduled formulation will result in negative impact on price trend of nonscheduled formulation. This will be in line with the objective of DPCO i.e. increasing the affordability and availability of medicines.

We conducted ITS analysis on pricing of each and every NLEM/non-NLEM samples of molecules/SKU and the result is given in Table 5.8

DPCO 2013 (ITS) - PRICE									
	NEGATIVE	POSITIVE	NON-		NEGATIVE	POSITIVE	NON-		
	IMPACT	IMPACT	SIGNIFICANT	TOTAL	IMPACT	IMPACT	SIGNIFICANT		
	(Nos)	(Nos)	(Nos)	(Nos)	%	%	%		
			SKU L	EVEL AN	ALYSIS				
NLEM SKU	54	22	46	122	44.26%	18.03%	37.70%		
NON NLEM SKU	9	20	27	56	16.07%	35.71%	48.21%		
			MOLECU	LE LEVEL	ANALYSIS				
NLEM MOLECULE	15	7	25	47	31.91%	14.89%	53.19%		
NON NLEM									
MOLECULE	6	25	29	60	10.00%	41.67%	48.33%		
		TABLE 5.8							

As expected, a higher proportion of NLEM sample has shown significant negative impact on price trends post DPCO 2103. On contrary, a higher proportion of non-NLEM sample of molecules/SKU has shown an increasing trend in price post DPCO 2103. Hence, we reject the

Hypothesis 2 i.e. the prices of the sample of Scheduled Formulations on total did not influence the prices of sample of Non-Scheduled Formulations.

**Hypothesis 3:** Post DPCO, 2013, sales of specified dosages and strengths have grown (by volume) at a higher rate than others, thereby promoting standard treatment guidelines.

Hypothesis 3 test the impact of DPCO 2103 on the standard treatment guidelines. It is proposed that due to DPCO 2013 the difference between the scheduled formulation growth % and the non-scheduled formulation growth % will be significantly greater than zero. The implication is that the increase in sales trend of scheduled formulation post DPCO will be significantly higher than the increase in sales trend of non- scheduled formulation.

The above hypothesis was tested using t-test on aggregate NLEM and non NLEM sample SKUs growth rates on monthly basis from July 2013 to June 2015. However, t-test result showed that there is no significant difference in the growth rate of both scheduled formulation and non-scheduled formulations post DPCO 2103. The result was repeated once again at aggregated molecule level and once again the hypothesis is rejected.

**Hypothesis 4:** Post DPCO, 2013, sales of specified dosages and strengths have grown (by volume) at a higher rate than before (Prior to DPCO 2013), thereby promoting rational use of medicines

Hypothesis 4 test the impact of DPCO 2103 on rational use of the medicines. It is proposed that due to DPCO 2013 the difference in the growth % of scheduled formulation after introduction of DPCO 2013 and before introduction of DPCO 2103 will be significantly greater than zero. The implication is that the increase in sales trend of scheduled formulation post

DPCO will be significantly higher than the increase in sales trend of scheduled formulation before DPCO 2103.

The above hypothesis was tested using t-test on aggregate NLEM sample SKUs growth rates on monthly basis from July 2012 to June 2013 and the growth rates from July 2013 to June 2104. However, t-test result showed that there is no significant difference in the growth rate of scheduled formulation prior and post DPCO 2103. The result was repeated once again at aggregated molecule level and once again the hypothesis is rejected.

Hypothesis No	Hypothesis	Supported / Not Supported
1	Access and availability of Scheduled Formulations have improved (by volume) under the DPCO 2013	Not Supported
2	Post DPCO 2013, the prices of Scheduled Formulations had an influence on the prices of Non-Scheduled Formulations	Not Supported
3	Post DPCO, 2013, sales of specified dosages and strengths have grown (by volume) at a higher rate than others, thereby promoting standard treatment guidelines	Not Supported
4	Post DPCO, 2013, sales of specified dosages and strengths have grown (by volume) at a higher rate than before (Prior to DPCO 2013), thereby promoting rational use of medicines	Not Supported

#### **RESULTS SUMMARY TABLE**

TABLE 5.9

#### 6. CONTEXTUAL FACTORS INFLUENCING RESULTS

What are some contextual factors leading to the results that we obtain? These factors can be summarized as under.

- 1. Competition in the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry
- 2. Impact of Imported API Prices on Indian Pharma Prices
- 3. Cost Based Pricing vs. Market Based Pricing in Price Control
- 4. Firm Related Factors
- 5. Experience of Other Industries

Below we provide details of these factors.

#### **Competition in Indian Pharmaceutical Industry:**

The market structure of pharmaceutical industries around globe lies between the perfect competition and monopolistic competition due to the presence of generic molecules and R&D driven innovation in pharmaceutical industry. Standard economic theories suggest that in both perfect competition and monopolistically competition the consumer surplus is maximized at the expense of producer surplus. The firms have little market power and hence couldn't raise price to increase the profits. The price elasticity is very high in monopolistically competitive industry and in long run the economic profit of the firm reaches zero. However, on the downside there is a possibility of monopoly market structure in newly developed drugs until the competition catches up.

The Indian pharmaceutical industry is characterized by very high competition. The Herfindahl index is a measure of competitive intensity of an industry and measures the size of firms in relation to the industry. US Agencies generally classify market into three types based on the Herfindahl index: 1) Unconcentrated markets (Herfindahl index value < 0.15) 2) Moderately

concentrated markets (Herfindahl index Values between 0.15 and 0.25) and 3) highly concentrated markets (Herfindahl index Values > 0.25). (Ref: https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010).

We calculated the Herfindahl index for randomly selected NLEM SKU in top seven therapeutic categories from the molecules with an annual sale of at least Rs 100 crores. The results as shown in the below table confirm the presence of competitive intensity of Indian pharmaceutical industry. In 6 out of the 8 sample NLEM SKUs competition exist between products offered by more than 50 firms. The competitive intensity is validated by the Herfindahl index values with 5 of the sample having the Herfindahl index of less than 0.15 indicating unconcentrated markets with very high levels of competition. On the other hand, two of the sample NLEM SKUs have less than 11 firm competing resulting in higher Herfindahl index indicating concentrated markets for those molecules.

The Table below illustrates the calculated values of the HH Index for NLEM molecules in India.

On a whole the analysis of Indian pharmaceutical industry reveals a highly competitive industry structure and based on the standard economic theories, competitive market structure should lead to a market clearing prices and increased consumer surplus. With increased competition comes an automatic downward price pressure.

A AIOCD-AWACS MAT 2019 report shows that 11% of the formulations in India are under the price point of Rs. 5. There are studies that document that prices of Indian generic medicines are amongst the lowest in the world.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup><u>https://gh.bmj.com/content/3/1/e000571#block-system-main.</u>

#### Table

#### Calculation of HH Index for NLEM molecules

S.No	тс	SKU	MAT July 2018 (INR cr)	Unit MAT July 2018 (in thousands)	% Value share in IPM - MAT July 2018	% Unit share in IPM - MAT July 2018	% Value share in Supergroup/TA - MAT July 2018	% Unit share in Supergroup/TA - MAT July 2018	No of Firms	Herfindahl Index
1	Anti-Diabetic	Metformin  Tablet 500 mg	231	132276	0.20%	0.50%	2.00%	9.40%	57	0.144
2	Anti-infectives	Amoxicillin (A) + Clavulanic acid (B)  Tablet 500 mg (A) + 125 mg (B)	1120	103086	0.90%	0.40%	7.20%	3.90%	73	0.099
3	Anti-infectives	Azithromycin  Tablet 500 mg	390	69815	0.30%	0.30%	2.50%	2.60%	103	0.104
4	Cardiac	Telmisartan  Tablet 40 mg	470	89041	0.40%	0.30%	3.10%	3.40%	72	0.121
5	Derma	Fluconazole  Tablet 150 mg	96	96608	0.10%	0.40%	1.00%	5.80%	76	0.100
6	Gastro Intestinal	Ranitidine  Tablet 150 mg	436	287898	0.30%	1.20%	3.30%	7.60%	11	0.249
7	Pain / Analgesics	Paracetamol  Tablet 650 mg	247	141630	0.20%	0.60%	2.50%	5.30%	52	0.388
8	Respiratory	Budesonide (A)+ Formoterol (B)  Inhalation (MDI/DPI) 200 mcg (A) + 6 mcg (B)	255	17115	0.20%	0.10%	2.50%	0.60%	8	0.305

#### **Impact of API price on Indian Pharmaceutical Industry:**

The drugs are made up of two basic ingredients 1) Activated pharmaceutical ingredients (API) which are active ingredients in drug providing therapeutic effect and 2) excipients which are chemically inactive substances that help in delivering the medication. Generally, the APIs represent the maximum contribution in COGS (in the range of 40%-60%) of any medicine. One of the key changes in DPCO 2013 is that annual increase in drugs price is linked to WPI changes. The margin of drug manufacturers will not be impacted as long as the increase in API prices are in line with increase in WPI. However, in past 6 years API prices, in most cases, has increased by 10% CAGR against the CAGR 2.9% increase of drug prices allowed under DPCO 2013 (Ref: PwC API Paper). One of the key reasons is the dependent on China for import of APIs and internal factors affecting the Chinese API industry. Indian industry imports around 85% of APIs from china (Ref: https://www.tpci.in/blogs/the-api-paradox-of-indiaspharmaceutical-industry/). However, in past 15-18 months more than 150 API manufacturers in China have been closed down due to crackdown on polluting industries resulting in increase of prices of APIs imported from china by 25-30%. On one hand this might provide an opportunity to Indian API manufacturers who are operating at far less capacity utilization than their Chinese counterparts. On the other hand, it creates a huge pressure on margins for drugs manufactured by Indian pharmaceutical industry and can make businesses unviable. One way of alleviating the issue is to include the global prices of corresponding APIs in pricing mechanism of Indian drugs.

#### **Cost Based Pricing vs Market Based Pricing:**

The cost-based pricing was used among Asian countries as price control mechanism for drugs. In an unpublished work (Saif, 2011) has mentioned that cost-plus pricing methods has been identified as price control mechanism in 13 countries. The work hasn't fully identified all the countries but mentioned India, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Iran as the countries which have used cost-plus pricing. The author also mentioned Colombia as the one of the 13 countries which however at that point of time has discontinued cost-plus pricing. The work mentioned the mixed results obtained by cost-plus pricing on the stated objective. In Bangladesh the costplus pricing has increased the sales of essential medicines but the growth has tapered off subsequently. With respect to china, the report concluded that the availability of medicines were low, prices are 5.6-8.8 times greater than international reference prices for originator brands and 1.2-2.0 times greater for generic products. In Iran the prices of medicine were at par with international reference prices. WHO on their guideline for pharmaceutical pricing policies suggested to avoid cost-plus as an overall pharma pricing policy. One of the reasons for pessimistic view by WHO on cost-plus pricing is lack of evaluative research or systematic reviews documenting the results of price control by cost-plus approach. The challenge for the cost-plus approach includes reliable determination of manufacturing cost, requirement of technical and human resources to validate component prices, opportunity for manipulation to the advantage of manufacturers, switching over to in appropriate price-controlled medicines and disadvantageous to local small manufacturers. In the case of using of cost-plus pricing policy, WHO suggest complimentary policies to determine what components to be included in pricing formulae and a transparent policy and verification of prices. (Rovira and Darba, 2001) in their paper on Pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement in Spain has identified Spain using cost plus pricing based on 1964 formula to determine drug pricing. The paper also specified that the price determined by cost-plus pricing determined seldom become definitive price as they are costlier than the international reference prices. The neighbouring countries such as Italy, France, Portugal and Greece have lower price products which result in lower prices in Spain than prescribed by the cost-plus pricing formula.

(Kyle, M. K, 2007) in their work on Pharmaceutical price controls and entry strategies has suggested 15 pharma pricing regulations used by several European countries. The paper conclude that firms headquartered in price control countries reach fewer markets than the countries without price control. The paper conclude that price control affects the strategies of domestic firms. WHO (2003) suggested three ways by which price controls of medicine was done 1) cost-plus pricing 2) controlling profit margin of firms and 3) Reference pricing. There are two types of reference pricing 1) External reference pricing or International reference pricing where price of medicine is controlled in one country by comparing the price of the medicine of other reference countries 2) Internal reference pricing, where the price of one drug is compared to the domestic price of therapeutically related drugs. WHO on their supply-side policy options cite the both reference pricing strategies result in direct price control while the cost-plus pricing will result in regulating profits. The literature has studied about the effects of Internal reference pricing and the results are generally positive. The research on reference pricing showed 10-25% reduction in prices in Germany and decreased the price of generic statins in Hungary. A study by Kanavos et al (2008) (80) concluded that reference pricing resulted in decrease of lowest generic prices by up to 47%, and, on an average, generic prices showed a significantly lower price decline over time. Portela, 2009 showed that Internal reference pricing has increased the market share for both generics and brands in Portugal. However, Drummond et al (2011) suggested that reference pricing supported by (Health Technology Assessment) HTA is most viable approach. Based on the above literature marketbased pricing followed in DPCO 2013 in line with the Internal reference pricing appears to be better pricing strategy.

#### **Firm Related Factors**

As economic actors, firms will respond to regulation with a view to continue their optimization problems with a newer set of constraints. For Indian pharma firms, typically, the constraint is that with prices that are amongst the lowest in the world, there is a need to achieve a decent level of profitability to be able to innovate. Compared to innovator pharma firms in the west where profit margins are in the range of 18-24%, Indian pharma firms have lower profit margins in the range of 9-14%. Innovation and new molecules requires at the very least, this level of profits. Lower prices in price control may act as an incentive to decrease a firm's focus on the drugs that are priced at levels where margins may be below internal benchmarks.

#### **Experience of other Industries:**

AJ Indian Fertilizer Industry: Fertilizer industry is the highly regulated industry in India with Indian government allocating Rs 70000 crores as subsidy for the fertilizer industry (Ref: https://www.alphainvesco.com/blog/fertilizer-industry-landscape-subsidy-scene-governmentpolicies/). There is leakage in administering the subsidy scheme like diversion of urea to industrial uses resulting in government initiating several measures such as soil health card scheme to contain the diversion. The manufacturers are paid on cost-plus basis resulting in little incentive to improve efficiency (Ravinutala, 2016). (Soumita, 2017) estimated that Indian fertilizer industry runs at 57% technical efficiency on an average with scope for further improvement. The increased efficiency of Indian fertilizer units will reduce the import burden of the country. The price of Urea is being controlled and phosphorus and potash fertilizers have been decontrolled in 1992. This has resulted in farmers to use urea in place of the P and K fertilizers resulting in consumption of N: P: K in ratio of 8:3:1 against the optimal ratio of 4:2:1. This uneven consumption lead to diminishing crop yields and increased soil toxicity. The investment has also been relatively mute in comparison with the completely deregularised industries. The distortions due to price control of urea include 1) 51% of Indian farmers buy urea at above-MRP due to black marketing 2) black market prices are 61% higher than the stipulated prices 3) Black market hurts small and marginal farmers more than the large farm holders (17% extra expenditure on an average) (Economic Survey 2015-16).

B] Sugar Industry: India is the second largest producer of sugar in the world with Indian sugar industry being Rs 80000 crore industry. Indian sugar industry face dual cane pricing from both central and state governments. The central government fixes a uniform FRP (fair and remunerative price) for sugar which is the minimum price the sugar mills have to pay to the farmers for their sugarcane. Several state governments fix State advised price which generally will be higher than the FRP. These dual pricing results in pricing distortions leading to price arrears and cyclicality in production-consumption disparity. The price distortions also resulted in Indian sugarcane prices being among the highest in the world and Indian sugar price being among the lowest in the world and also result in high production cost (Ref: https://www.indiansugar.com/uploads/presentation before rangarajan committee.pdf ). Unlike the major sugar producers, there is no relationship between sugarcane price and sugar price in India. The price distortion resulted in India being dragged to WTO by brazil and Australia. The price distortion resulted in high sugar surplus with sugar surplus in 2018-19 expected to be 48% of annual consumption (Ref; Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.). The sugar surplus result in delayed payments to farmers and mounting arrears for the sugar mills. The sugar mills could not export the excess sugar due to high sugarcane price and high production cost resulting in unviability of the sugar mills

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#### 7. CONCLUSIONS

The objective of this study was to evaluate the impact of introduction of DPCO 2103 on the affordability and availability of scheduled formulations, reducing the cost of purchase of medicines, promoting standard treatment guidelines and rational use of medicines. The testing of hypothesis in this study showed that on aggregate level DPCO 2103 hasn't significantly increased the affordability and access. The DPCO 2103 also didn't significantly negatively impact access, either. There are some external factors beyond DPCO 2103 and NLEM 2015 that also would have played a key role in impacting the stated objectives – such as marketing effort of the companies in relation to the affected molecules, the GP growth rates in particular areas, the split between urban and rural areas and so on. But these are beyond the scope of the study.

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## APPENDIX A

## EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS RESULTS - IMPACT OF DPCO 2013

# NLEM SKU Samples: \* - Significant Abnormal change in Sales, NS - Non significant

			%	
			Abnormal	
			Change in	
	NLEM Medicine SKU		Sales	Significance
S.No	Dosage form & Strength	Seasonal ARIMA Model	Volume	at 5%
	Metformin  Tablet 1000 mg			
1	(Immediate and controlled release)	ARIMA(0,1,1) with drift	-2.10%	NS
2	Metformin  Tablet 500 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	3.43%	NS
		ARIMA(0,0,0) with non-zero		
3	Metformin  Tablet 750 mg	mean		NS
	Amoxicillin (A) + Clavulanic acid (B)  Dry	ARIMA(0,0,0) with non-zero		
4	Syrup 125 mg (A) + 31.25 (B)/5 ml	mean	46.03%	NS
	Amoxicillin (A) + Clavulanic acid (B)  Oral	ARIMA(2,0,1)(0,1,0)[12] with		
5	liquid 200 mg (A) + 28.5 mg (B)/5 ml	drift	8.04%	*
	Amoxicillin (A) + Clavulanic acid (B)	ARIMA(2,0,0) with non-zero		
6	Powder for Injection 1 g (A) + 200 mg (B)	mean	7.52%	*
	Amoxicillin (A) + Clavulanic acid (B)			
	Powder for Injection 500 mg (A) + 100	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
7	mg (B)	drift	-2.54%	NS
	Amoxicillin (A) + Clavulanic acid (B)	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
8	Tablet 500 mg (A) + 125 mg (B)	drift	2.60%	NS
		ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12] with		
9	Amoxicillin  Capsule 250 mg	drift	21.79%	*
		ARIMA(1,0,0) with non-zero		
10	Amoxicillin  Capsule 500 mg	mean	21.03%	*
		ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12] with		
11	Amoxicillin  Oral liquid 250 mg/5 ml	drift	-7.60%	NS
		ARIMA(0,0,1) with non-zero		
12	Ampicillin  Powder for Injection 1 g	mean	-85.13%	*
13	Ampicillin  Powder for Injection 500 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	20.30%	*
		ARIMA(0,0,2)(0,1,0)[12] with		
14	Azithromycin  Oral liquid 200 mg/5ml		11.89%	*
1	Azithromycin  Powder for Injection 500	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with	10.000/	*
15			19.90%	
16	Azithromycin  Tablet 250 mg	ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12]	5.41%	NS
17	Azithromycin  Tablet 500 mg	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]	5.23%	NS
10		ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12] with	4.000	
18	Cetixime  Oral liquid 100 mg/5 ml	aritt	-1.03%	NS

		$\Delta RIMA(2,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]$ with	1 1	
19	Cefixime  Oral liquid 50 mg/5 ml	drift	3.37%	NS
		ARIMA(0.0.1)(0.1.0)[12] with		
20	Cefixime  Tablet 200 mg	drift	-7.88%	*
21	Cefixime  Tablet 400 mg	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]	-18.47%	*
	· · ·	ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12] with		
22	Ceftriaxone  Powder for Injection 1 g	drift	-6.85%	NS
		ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
23	Ceftriaxone  Powder for Injection 2 g	drift	0.19%	NS
		ARIMA(0,0,1) with non-zero		
24	Ceftriaxone  Powder for Injection 250 mg	mean	1.12%	NS
25	Cofficiency   Douglass for Injection 500 mg	ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12] with	14 410/	NC
25	Certriaxone [Powder for Injection 500 mg		-14.41%	<u>NS</u>
26	Ciprofloxacin  Injection 200 mg/100 ml	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]	-22.62%	*
27	Ciproflovacin ITablet 250 mg	ANIIVIA(U,U,U)(U,1,U)[12] WITN	2 670/	NIC
21	Cipronovacini pravlet 230 mg	$\Delta RIMA(2.0.0)(0.1.0)[12] \text{ with}$	-5.07%	CNI
28	Ciprofloxacin   Tablet 500 mg	drift	-4.86%	NS
20		ARIMA(0.0.0)(0.1.0)[12] with	1.0070	113
29	Doxycycline  Capsule 100 mg	drift	-1.57%	NS
	,, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
30	Metronidazole  Injection 500 mg/100 ml	drift	-12.91%	*
31	Albendazole  Oral liquid 200 mg/5 ml	ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12]	17.81%	*
32	Albendazole  Tablet 400 mg	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]	4.40%	NS
33	Metronidazole  Tablet 200 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)	-50.70%	*
34	Metronidazole  Tablet 400 mg	ARIMA(0,1,0)	-42.21%	*
		ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12] with		
35	Acyclovir  Oral liquid 400 mg/5 ml	drift	-9.06%	NS
36	Acyclovir   Powder for Injection 250 mg	ARIMA(0,1,0)(0,1,0)[12]	-31.40%	*
		ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
37	Acyclovir   Powder for Injection 500 mg	drift	31.08%	*
38	Acyclovir  Tablet 200 mg	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]	-4.84%	NS
39	Acyclovir  Tablet 400 mg	ARIMA(0,1,0)(0,1,0)[12]	37.56%	*
40	Folic acid  Tablet 5 mg	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]	-7.50%	NS
	Acetylsalicylic acid  Effervescent/			
41	Dispersible/ Enteric coated Tablet 150 mg	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]	1.91%	NS
	Acetylsalicylic acid  Effervescent/			
	Dispersible/ Enteric coated Tablet 300 mg	ARIMA(0,0,0) with non-zero		
42	to 500 mg	mean	-9.95%	*
	Acetylsalicylic acid  Effervescent/			
43	Dispersible/ Enteric coated Tablet 75 mg	ARIMA(2,1,0)	7.12%	*
44	Acetylsalicylic acid  Tablet 100 mg	ARIMA(0,1,0)	-94.19%	*
45	Acetylsalicylic acid  Tablet 150 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)	-17.99%	*
		ARIMA(0,0,0) with non-zero		
46	Acetylsalicylic acid  Tablet 75 mg	mean	-13.77%	*
47	Amlodipine  Tablet 10 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	-0.50%	NS

	i de la constante d			
48	Amlodipine  Tablet 2.5 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	6.82%	*
49	Amlodipine  Tablet 5 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	-1.34%	NS
50	Atorvastatin  Tablet 10 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	8.60%	*
51	Atorvastatin  Tablet 20 mg	ARIMA(2,1,0) with drift	-3.07%	*
		ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
52	Atorvastatin  Tablet 40 mg	drift	-3.12%	*
53	Furosemide  Injection 10 mg/ ml	ARIMA(0,1,1)	-2.37%	NS
54	Furosemide  Oral liquid 10 mg/ml	ARIMA(2,1,0) with drift	-1.06%	NS
55	Furosemide  Tablet 40 mg	ARIMA(1,1,0)(0,1,0)[12]	7.94%	NS
56	Metoprolol  Tablet 25 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1) with drift	-9.75%	*
57	Metoprolol  Tablet 50 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1) with drift	-12.44%	*
58	Propranolol  Tablet 10 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1) with drift	-5.38%	*
59	Propranolol  Tablet 40 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	-0.46%	NS
60	Propranolol  Tablet 80 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)	-3.90%	NS
61	Clotrimazole  Cream 1%	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]	8.58%	*
62	Clotrimazole  Drops 1%	ARIMA(1,1,0)(0,1,0)[12]	10.52%	NS
63	Clotrimazole   Pessary 100 mg	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]	-9.96%	*
64	Fluconazole  Injection 200 mg /100 ml	ARIMA(0,1,1)	21.13%	*
65	Fluconazole  Oral liquid 50 mg/5 ml	ARIMA(0,1,0)	-106.85%	*
66	Fluconazole  Tablet 100 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	23.17%	*
67	Fluconazole  Tablet 150 mg	ARIMA(1,1,0)(0,1,0)[12]	9.22%	*
		ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
68	Fluconazole  Tablet 200 mg	drift	29.39%	*
69	Fluconazole  Tablet 400 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	20.65%	*
70	Povidone iodine  Solution 4% to 10%	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	1.78%	NS
71	Salicylic acid  Ointment 6%	ARIMA(0,1,1)	87.69%	*
		ARIMA(0,0,0) with non-zero		
72	Silver sulphadiazine  Cream 1%	mean	-15.58%	NS
73	Domperidone  Oral liquid 1 mg/ml	ARIMA(1,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]	-1.21%	NS
74	Domperidone  Tablet 10 mg	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]	-4.88%	NS
75	Ondansetron  Injection 2 mg/ml	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	3.45%	NS
70		ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12] with	2 610	NC
76	Ondansetron  Oral liquid 2 mg/5 mi		-2.61%	INS
77	Ondansetron ITablet 4 mg	drift	1 27%	NS
,,		ARIMA(0.0.0)(0.1.0)[12] with	1.2770	113
78	Ondansetron  Tablet 8 mg	drift	-1.37%	NS
79	Ranitidine  Injection 25 mg/ml	ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12]	-5.51%	NS
		ARIMA(0,0,0) with non-zero		
80	Ranitidine  Oral liquid 75 mg/5 ml	mean	100.00%	*
		ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12] with		
81	Ranitidine  Tablet 150 mg	drift	2.55%	NS
82	Clomiphene  Tablet 100 mg	ARIMA(0,1,0)	-12.78%	*
83	Clomiphene  Tablet 50 mg	ARIMA(0,1,0)	-28.51%	*

I	Medroxyprogesteroneacetate  Tablet 10		1	
84	mg	ARIMA(0,1,0)	-11.86%	*
85	Misoprostol  Tablet 100 mcg	ARIMA(0,1,1)	-48.49%	*
		ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
86	Misoprostol  Tablet 200 mcg	drift	-25.17%	*
87	Nitrofurantoin  Oral liquid 25 mg/5 ml	ARIMA(0,1,0)	75.52%	*
		ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
88	Nitrofurantoin  Tablet 100 mg	drift	27.84%	*
		ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
89	Norethisterone  Tablet 5 mg	drift	-1.49%	NS
90	Dexamethasone  Injection 4 mg/ml	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]	-8.41%	NS
91	Dexamethasone  Tablet 0.5 mg	ARIMA(0,1,2)	-33.38%	*
	Levothyroxine  Tablet 12.5 mcg to 150			
	mcg <sup>*</sup> (Several strengths are available in			
	1101 Kel Sulli as 12.3, 23, 30, 62.3, 75, 88,			
92	to give a range of available strengths)	ARIMA(0.1.0)(0.1.0)[12]	-1.03%	NS
52		ARIMA(0.0.0)(0.1.0)[12] with	1.0370	115
93	Methylprednisolone  Injection 40 mg/ml	drift	-1.65%	NS
94	Methylprednisolone  Tablet 16 mg	ARIMA(0,1,0)(0,1,0)[12]	9.41%	*
95	Methylprednisolone  Tablet 8 mg	ARIMA(0,1,0)	1.98%	NS
96	Prednisolone  Injection 20 mg/2 ml	ARIMA(0.1.0)	-350.00%	*
		ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
97	Prednisolone  Oral liquid 15 mg/5 ml	drift	16.30%	*
		ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12] with		
98	Prednisolone  Oral liquid 5 mg/5 ml	drift	25.38%	*
99	Prednisolone  Tablet 10 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	16.96%	*
		ARIMA(0,0,1) with non-zero		
100	Prednisolone  Tablet 20 mg	mean	-9.03%	*
101	Prednisolone  Tablet 40 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)	-1.18%	NS
		ARIMA(1,0,0) with non-zero		
102	Prednisolone  Tablet 5 mg	mean	-5.74%	*
102	Amitrintulina ITablat 10 mg	AKIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with	2 1 60/	*
103	Amitriptyline   Tablet 10 mg		-2.10%	*
104		ARIMA(0, 1, 0)	-0.01%	
105	Amitriptyline   Tablet 50 mg	mean	-6.67%	NS
106	Amitriptyline   Tablet 75 mg	ARIMA(1,1,0)(0,1,0)[12]	-7.34%	*
107	Trihexyphenidyl ITablet 2 mg	ARIMA(2,1,1) with drift	-23 78%	*
107		ARIMA(0.0.0)(0.1.0)[12] with	23.7070	
108	Acyclovir  Ointment 3%	drift	16.06%	*
	-	ARIMA(1,0,0) with non-zero	1	
109	Ciprofloxacin  Drops 0.3 %	mean	-0.18%	NS
		ARIMA(0,0,0) with non-zero		
110	Ciprofloxacin  Ointment 0.3%	mean	-4.39%	*
111	Prednisolone  Drops 1%	ARIMA(0,1,0)	47.85%	NS
112	Diclofenac  Injection 25 mg/ml	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	12.20%	NS

113	Diclofenac  Tablet 50 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	12.20%	*
	Paracetamol  All licenced oral liquid	ARIMA(0,0,2)(0,1,0)[12] with		
114	dosage forms and strengths	drift	12.20%	NS
		ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
115	Paracetamol  Injection 150 mg/ml	drift	12.20%	*
		ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
116	Paracetamol  Suppository 170 mg	drift	12.20%	*
117	Paracetamol  Suppository 80 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	12.20%	*
118	Paracetamol  Tablet 500 mg	ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12]	12.20%	NS
		ARIMA(2,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
119	Paracetamol  Tablet 650 mg	drift	12.20%	NS
		ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12] with		
120	Cetirizine  Oral liquid 5 mg/5 ml	drift	12.20%	NS
121	Cetirizine  Tablet 10 mg	ARIMA(1,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]	12.20%	*
	Salbutamol  Inhalation (MDI/DPI) 100			
122	mcg/dose	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	12.20%	*
123	Salbutamol  Oral liquid 2 mg/5 ml	ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12]	12.20%	NS
	Salbutamol  Respirator solution for use in			
124	nebulizer 5mg/ml	ARIMA(1,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]	12.20%	NS
125	Salbutamol  Tablet 2 mg	ARIMA(1,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]	12.20%	NS
126	Salbutamol  Tablet 4 mg	ARIMA(1,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]	12.20%	*
		ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
127	Ascorbic acid (Vitamin C)  Tablet 500 mg	drift	12.20%	NS

# Non NLEM SKU Sample: \* - Significant Abnormal change in Sales, NS – Non significant

S.No	Non NLEM Medicine SKU  Dosage form & Strength	Seasonal ARIMA Model	% Abnormal Change in Sales Volume	Significance at 5%
1	Glimepiride  Tablet 1 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	-6.17%	*
2	Glimepiride  Tablet 2 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	-2.88%	*
		ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12] with		
3	Levofloxacin  Tablet 250 mg	drift	2.78%	NS
4	Levofloxacin  Tablet 500 mg	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]	-16.52%	*
5	Levofloxacin  Tablet 750 mg	ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12]	-8.11%	*
6	Linezolid  Tablet 600 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	-10.01%	*
7	Moxifloxacin   Tablet 400 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1) with drift	1.23%	NS
		ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
8	Tranexamic acid  Injection 100 mg/ml	drift	-4.82%	*
9	Tranexamic acid  Tablet 500 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	5.66%	*
10	Telmisartan  Tablet 20 mg	ARIMA(0,1,0)(0,1,0)[12]	-17.26%	*

11	Telmisartan   Tablet 40 mg	ARIMA(0,1,0)(0,1,0)[12]	-13.72%	*
12	Telmisartan  Tablet 80 mg	ARIMA(0,1,0)(0,1,0)[12]	-15.82%	*
13	Fusidic acid  Cream 2%	ARIMA(1,1,0)(0,1,0)[12]	1.48%	NS
	•	ARIMA(0,0,0) with non-zero		
14	Lactulose  Oral liquid 10 g/15 ml	mean	100.00%	*
		ARIMA(1,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
15	Iron sucrose  Injection 20 mg/ml	drift	-5.61%	*
16	Clonazepam  Tablet 0.25 mg	ARIMA(0,1,2)(0,1,0)[12]	4.30%	*
17	Clonazepam  Tablet 0.5 mg	ARIMA(1,1,0)(0,1,0)[12]	0.62%	NS
		ARIMA(1,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
18	Clonazepam  Tablet 1 mg	drift	2.65%	NS
19	Escitalopram  Tablet 10 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	-3.01%	*
20	Escitalopram  Tablet 20 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1) with drift	-3.84%	*
21	Escitalopram  Tablet 5 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	1.11%	NS
		ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
22	Flunarizine  Tablet 10 mg	drift	-7.06%	*
22		ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12] with	2 5 20/	*
23	Fiunarizine   lablet 5 mg		-3.52%	۰ <u>۲</u>
24	Bicalutamide   Tablet 50 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)	8.92%	т 
25	Letrozole  Tablet 2.5 mg	ARIMA(0,1,1)	5.91%	NS
	Budesonide (A)+ Formoterol (B)			
26	mcg(B)	ARIMA(0 1 1)(0 1 0)[12]	15 46%	*
20	Budesonide (A)+ Formoterol (B)		13.10/0	
	Inhalation (MDI/DPI) 200 mcg (A) + 6			
27	mcg (B)	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	3.16%	*
	Budesonide (A)+ Formoterol (B)			
	Inhalation (MDI/DPI) 400 mcg (A) + 6	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
28	mcg (B)	drift	4.77%	*
	Budesonide  Inhalation (MDI/DPI) 100	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
29	mcg/dose	drift	28.53%	*
	Budesonide  Inhalation (MDI/DPI) 200			
30	mcg/dose	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	0.55%	NS
	Budesonide  Respirator solution for use in	ARIMA(0,0,1)(0,1,0)[12] with		
31	nebulizer 0.5 mg/ml	drift	9.81%	*
	Budesonide  Respirator solution for use in			
32	nebulizer 1 mg/ml	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	-13.21%	*
33	Xylometazoline  Nasal drops 0.05 %	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12]	10.24%	*
34	Xylometazoline  Nasal drops 0.1 %	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	12.64%	*
35	Cholecalciferol  Oral liquid 400 IU/ml	ARIMA(0,2,1)	-49.41%	*
36	Cholecalciferol  Tablet 1000 IU	ARIMA(0,2,1)	-43.66%	*
37	Cholecalciferol  Tablet 60000 IU	ARIMA(0,2,1)	-25.81%	*
	ACETYLCYSTEINE   ORAL SOLID ORDINARY	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
38	EFFERVESCENT TABLETS   600 MG	drift	11.63%	*

		1		
20	ACICLOVIR ORAL SOLID ORDINARY		10.00%	*
			10.90%	•
40	ALBENDAZOLE   ORAL LIQUID ORDINARY	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with	1 57%	NIS
40			1.5770	115
	AMOXICILLIN TRIHYDRATE + CLAVULANIC			
		ABIMA(2,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
41	SUSPENSIONS/SYRUPS/DROPS/228 MG	drift	4.44%	NS
	ATORVASTATIN CALCIUM SALT ORAL			
	SOLID ORDINARY FILM-COATED			
42	TABLETS 80 MG	ARIMA(1,1,0)(0,1,0)[12]	2.11%	NS
	BETAMETHASONE DISODIUM			
	PHOSPHATE ORAL SOLID ORDINARY	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[12] with		
43		drift	-5.67%	NS
		ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,1,0)[1,2] with		
44	MG	drift	18.38%	NS
	COLECALCIFEROL LORAL SOLID ORDINARY			
45	CAPSULES 60 K	ARIMA(1,2,0)	-57.36%	*
	DICLOFENAC SODIUM SALT   PARENTERAL			
46	ORDINARY AMPOULES 75 MG	ARIMA(0,1,0)(0,1,0)[12]	36.54%	*
	EPOETIN ALFA			
	RECOMBINANT   PARENTERAL ORDINARY			.te
4/	PRE-FILLED SYRINGES 4000 IU	ARIMA(0,1,1) with drift	-17.30%	*
10	ETHAMBUTOL HYDROCHLORIDE ORAL		2 0.0%	NC
40		ARIMA(0,1,0)(0,1,0)[12]	5.09%	113
		A P   A A (0, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0) [1, 2] with		
49	FILM-COATED TABLETS 1.1 MG	drift	-10.02%	*
50	TABLETS 3 MG	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	16.65%	*
	GLUCOSE + SODIUM			
-	CHLORIDE   PARENTERAL ORDINARY			
51	INFUSION VIALS/BOTTLES   5 G	ARIMA(0,1,0)	11.93%	NS
	HEPARIN SODIUM SALT TOPICAL			
52	EXTERNAL OINTMENTS   50 IU	ARIMA(0,1,1)	-0.55%	NS
	LEVETIRACETAM   ORAL SOLID ORDINARY		0 700/	
53	FILM-COATED TABLETS   1000 MG	ARIMA(0,1,0) with drift	2.79%	NS
		ARIMA(0.0.1)(0.1.0)[12] with		
54	DROPS   0.5 %	drift	-6.70%	*
	PANTOPRAZOLE SODIUM SALT ORAL			
	SOLID ORDINARY ENTERIC-COATED			
55	TABLETS 40 MG	ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,0)[12]	-0.51%	NS
	POVIDONE-IODINE   TOPICAL EXTERNAL			
56	OINTMENTS   10 %	ARIMA(0,1,1)	99.72%	*

57	RITUXIMAB RECOMBINANT   PARENTERAL ORDINARY INFUSION VIALS/BOTTLES   500 MG	ARIMA(0,0,0) with non-zero	100 00%	*
57	SODIUM BICARBONATE I ORAL SOLID		100.0070	
	ORDINARY FILM-COATED TABLETS   1000	ARIMA(0,0,0) with non-zero		
58	MG	mean		NS
FO	VACCINE, POLIOMYELITIS INACTIVATED   PARENTERAL ORDINARY		12 910/	NIC
59	PRE-FILLED SYRINGES 0	AKIMA(1,1,0)	12.81%	NS

## APPENDIX B

# INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS RESULTS - IMPACT OF DPCO 2013

NLEM Molecules Samples: NS – Non significant, Otherwise significant at 5%

S.No	NLEM Molecule	Pre DCPO trend (units)	Post DCPO Level change (units)	Post DCPO trend (units)
1	Metformin	59.03	NS	-42.16
2	Amoxicillin (A) + Clavulanic acid (B)	73.77	NS	NS
3	Amoxicillin	NS	458.10	NS
4	Ampicillin	NS	NS	NS
5	Azithromycin	22.47	NS	NS
6	Cefixime	52.81	NS	-39.95
7	Ceftriaxone	128.25	- 1126.94	NS
8	Ciprofloxacin	-19.12	-583.82	51.31
9	Doxycycline	8.50	NS	NS
10	Metronidazole	NS	NS	NS
11	Albendazole	NS	NS	52.77
12	Metronidazole	45.12	NS	-43.06
13	Acyclovir	NS	NS	2.97
14	Folic acid	NS	NS	NS
15	Acetylsalicylic acid	NS	NS	NS
16	Amlodipine	30.09	NS	NS
17	Atorvastatin	NS	266.74	NS
18	Furosemide	10.60	NS	NS
19	Metoprolol	47.87	NS	-23.44
20	Propranolol	NS	NS	-8.68
21	Clotrimazole	NS	NS	2.35
22	Fluconazole	NS	319.58	38.44
23	Povidone iodine	NS	NS	2.05
24	Salicylic acid	NS	1.35	0.16
25	Silver sulphadiazine	NS	NS	NS
26	Domperidone	NS	NS	NS
27	Ondansetron	48.16	NS	45.27
28	Ranitidine	156.19	NS	-245.95
29	Clomiphene	NS	NS	NS
30	Medroxyprogesteroneacetate	1.82	NS	NS
31	Misoprostol	-3.70	NS	3.35

32	Nitrofurantoin	0.67	16.99	0.94
33	Norethisterone	5.41	NS	NS
			-	
34	Dexamethasone	123.85	2269.70	-184.93
35	Levothyroxine	33.64	NS	31.15
36	Methylprednisolone	NS	NS	NS
37	Prednisolone	NS	NS	NS
38	Amitriptyline	NS	NS	NS
39	Trihexyphenidyl	NS	-119.31	NS
40	Acyclovir	-0.07	1.02	0.05
41	Ciprofloxacin	NS	NS	NS
42	Prednisolone	NS	NS	1.61
43	Diclofenac	NS	-651.65	96.39
44	Paracetamol	123.02	NS	80.30
45	Cetirizine	23.75	NS	29.91
46	Salbutamol	50.56	NS	-41.94
47	Ascorbic acid (Vitamin C)	NS	NS	NS

Non NLEM Molecules Samples: NS – Non significant, Otherwise significant at 5%

		Pre DCPO trend	Post DCPO Level change	Post DCPO trend
S.No	non NLEM Molecule	(units)	(units)	(units)
1	Glimepiride	NS	NS	-15.97
2	Levofloxacin	NS	-239.72	-11.74
3	Linezolid	NS	NS	NS
4	Moxifloxacin	6.166	33.467	-5.21
5	Tranexamic acid	2.894	NS	NS
6	Telmisartan	51.816	NS	NS
7	Fusidic acid	NS	NS	NS
8	Lactulose	NS	NS	0.01
9	Iron sucrose	0.986	NS	NS
10	Clonazepam	NS	NS	NS
11	Escitalopram	4.299	NS	NS
12	Flunarizine	4.415	NS	NS
13	Bicalutamide	NS	NS	0.20
14	Letrozole	-1.856	NS	2.12
15	Budesonide (A)+ Formoterol (B)	11.715	NS	NS
16	Budesonide	33.013	NS	NS
17	Xylometazoline	NS	NS	NS

18	Cholecalciferol	5.138	NS	NS
19	ACECLOFENAC + PARACETAMOL + SERRAPEPTASE	18.488	NS	8.91
20	ALBENDAZOLE + IVERMECTIN	NS	NS	3.49
21	ARTEMOTIL	NS	NS	NS
22	ARTEROLANE MALEATE + PIPERAQUINE PHOSPHATE	0.963	NS	-1.40
23	CALCIUM CHLORIDE + DL-LACTIC ACID SODIUM SALT + POTASSIUM CHLORIDE + SODIUM CHLORIDE	NS	NS	NS
24	CHLORIDE	NS	NS	NS
25	CARMELLOSE SODIUM SALT	16.186	NS	NS
26	CEFPODOXIME PROXETIL	77.913	NS	-56.90
27	CHLORPHENAMINE MALEATE + PARACETAMOL + PHENYLEPHRINE HYDROCHLORIDE	14.991	NS	NS
28	CLONAZEPAM + ESCITALOPRAM OXALATE	9.477	NS	NS
29	DARBEPOETIN ALFA RECOMBINANT	0.112	NS	0.36
30	DEFLAZACORT	NS	NS	NS
31	DOMPERIDONE + PANTOPRAZOLE SODIUM SALT	57.461	NS	22.62
32	DOMPERIDONE + RABEPRAZOLE SODIUM SALT	61.861	NS	-21.52
33	DUTASTERIDE + TAMSULOSIN HYDROCHLORIDE	NS	NS	NS
34	EFAVIRENZ + EMTRICITABINE + TENOFOVIR DISOPROXIL FUMARATE	0.26	NS	-0.20
35	ETHAMBUTOL HYDROCHLORIDE + ISONIAZID + PYRAZINAMIDE + RIFAMPICIN	-8.208	NS	NS
36	GLUCOSE, BLOOD TESTS	NS	NS	1.31
37	HYDROCHLOROTHIAZIDE + TELMISARTAN		NS	NS
38	IBUPROFEN + PARACETAMOL		NS	NS
39	INSULIN HUMAN BASE RECOMBINANT + INSULIN HUMAN ISOPHANE RECOMBINANT	11.126	NS	NS
40	ISONIAZID + RIFAMPICIN	-6.985	NS	NS
41	ITRACONAZOLE	NS	NS	7.02
42	LEUPRORELIN ACETATE	0.095	NS	-0.24
43	LEVOCETIRIZINE HYDROCHLORIDE + MONTELUKAST SODIUM SALT	38.458	NS	NS
44	LULICONAZOLE	0.57	NS	2.23
45	MECOBALAMIN + PREGABALIN		NS	-4.94
46	MEFENAMIC ACID + TRANEXAMIC ACID		NS	NS
47	MEROPENEM TRIHYDRATE		NS	1.43
48	MIFEPRISTONE + MISOPROSTOL		NS	NS
49	MYCOPHENOLIC ACID SODIUM SALT		NS	0.48
50	NANDROLONE DECANOATE		NS	NS
51	ORNIDAZOLE	-1.578	NS	1.06
52	PREGNANCY TESTS	NS	NS	10.85
53	PROGESTERONE	5.546	NS	NS

54	ROSUVASTATIN CALCIUM SALT	42.012	NS	NS
55	SILDENAFIL CITRATE	NS	NS	12.54
56	VACCINE, PNEUMOCOCCAL CONJUGATE	0.918	NS	NS

### ANNEXURE C CATEGORY MAPPING IPA STUDY, IQVIA TA, NLEM CATEGORIES

	IPA Study		
	Therapeutic		
S.No	Categories	ΙQVIΑ ΤΑ	NLEM Categories
1	Anti-Infectives	Anti-Infectives, Antivirals, Derma, Anti- malarials, Anti-TB, Anti-Parasitic	Anti-Infectives, Derma, Antiseptic
2	Gastro Intestinal	Gastro Intestinal, Gynaec, Urology	GI, Oxytocics & Antioxytocics, Hormones & Contraceptives (Hormonal Contraceptives, Estrogen, Progestrone & Androgen, Hypoglycemia, Ovulation Inducers)
3	Others	Vitamins / Minerals / Nutrients, Opthal/Otologicals,Parenteral,Vaccines, Others	Antidotes, Disinfectant, Diagnostics, Ophthalmology, Contraceptives, Parenteral, Immunologicals, Vitamins
4	Neuro / Analgesics	Neuro / CNS, Pain / Analgesics	Anesthesia, Analgesics, Antipyretics & Anti Inflammatory, Anticonvulsants, AntiMigraine, AntiParkinson, Dementia, Muscle Relaxants, Psychotherapeutic
5	Cardiac and Blood Related	Cardiac, Blood Related	Blood, Cardio, Diuretics, Plasma
6	Hormones	Anti-Diabetic, Hormones	Hormones & Contraceptives (Anti-diabetic, Thyroids, Adrenal hormones)
7	Respiratory	Respiratory	Respiratory, Anti-allergics, ENT
8	Oncology	Oncology	Cancer